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Evidence: Taylor v. State - Oklahoma Abandons the
Frye Test and Forces Its State Court Judges to Enter the
Twilight Zone
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized ....
Frye v. United States'
L Introduction
On January 31, 1995, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided Taylor
v. State,2 thereby officially abandoning the Frye test,3 which was used to
determine the admissibility of scientific evidence.4 Many in the legal community
regard this decision as long overdue. While it is arguably true that the Frye test
should be abandoned,' the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to
follow the United States Supreme Court case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals? is questionable. The decision places Oklahoma's trial judges in
the role of "gatekeeper," but fails to provide the guidance needed to confront the
many difficult issues raised by scientific evidence and expert testimony.
While Daubert must be followed in federal courts, state courts are free to adopt
their own standards governing the admissibility of scientific evidence. Indeed,
many states have decided against adopting the Daubert methodology.7 It is
interesting that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided to adopt a
standard that so many other states have rejected.
1. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. 889 P.2d 319 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
3. Prior to Taylor, Oklahoma used the Frye "general acceptance" test which states: "Before scientific
evidence is admissible, there must be proof that the reliability of the tests used has gained general
acceptance and recognition in the concerned scientific community." Yell v. State, 856 P.2d 996, 996
(Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 840 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986)).
4. Taylor, 889 P.2d at 328.
5. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Haf Century Later, 80 COLum. L. REV. 1197, 1250 (1980) (concluding that the Frye test has "proved
unworkable").
6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7. Taylor, 889 P.2d at 328 n.32 (stating that, as of Jan. 31, 1995, seventeen reported state court
decisions had considered Daubert and in only two of those did the state court decide to abandon Frye
in favor of Daubert).
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Initially, this note will examine the Frye and Daubert decisions and how they
have been applied in Oklahoma. Next, the Oklahoma case of Taylor v. State8 will
be explored. Finally, this note will conclude with an analysis of how the Taylor
decision will affect Oklahoma's state court judges in future trials involving the
admission of novel scientific evidence or expert testimony.
I. Historical Background
A. Frye v. United SNates
1. Facts of Frye
In Frye, the defendant appealed a second degree murder conviction. Prior to
trial, the defendant voluntarily submitted to a systolic blood pressure deception
test.' During trial, the defense offered the scientist who had administered the test
as an expert witness to testify to the result of the test, or alternatively, to have the
scientist administer the test to the defendant in the presence of the jury."0 The
court refused both of these requests." In upholding the trial court's decision, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the systolic blood pressure
deception test had not gained "standing and scientific recognition" among experts
in the physiological and psychological fields to justify its admission into evi-
dence."2 The court reasoned that any form of novel scientific evidence "must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs" bafore it will be admitted into evidence. 3 The test established
in Frye has become known as the "general acceptance" test.
2. The Frye General Acceptance Test
Under the Frye "general acceptance" test, the party seeking to have scientific
evidence admitted tears the burden of establishing its'underlying scientific basis
and reliability." This can be accomplished by having an expert in the specific
field testify that the scientific community regards the particular technology as
reliable. While not specifically required in Frye, most courts find that the
application of the Frye test requires a two prong analysis."5 The trial judge must
determine: (1) whether the underlying theory is generally accepted and (2) whether
the particular technique at issue is generally accepted. 6 General acceptance by
those who have the greatest knowledge of a technique reportedly guarantees that
8. 889 P.2d 319 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
9. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
10. IL at 1014.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Mitchell v. Statc, 884 P.2d 1186, 1198 n.30 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
15. Cassandra C. Cclchagoff, A New Era for Science and the Law: The Face of Scientific Evidence
in the Federal Courts after Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 29 TULSA L.J. 735, 738
(1994).
16. Id.
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there will be a group of experts familiar with that technique to critically examine
its reliability and application in a certain case. 7 Universal acceptance is not
required to show general acceptance.' 8
3. Criticisms of Frye
While many state and federal courts have used the standard set forth in Frye,
the validity of the Frye test has been debated. The debates have centered around
two concerns: (1) vagueness in the applicati6n of the test and (2) Frye's essentially
conservative character. 9 Also, uncertainties in determining the appropriate
scientific field and the level of acceptance required create difficulties in imple-
menting the test.' These criticisms of Frye, coupled with uncertainty as to how
the Federal Rules of Evidence affected Frye, led the Supreme Court of the United
States to rule, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, that the Federal Rules
of Evidence superseded Frye."'
4. Oklahoma's Application of Frye
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals adopted Frye in 1951.' Since then,
Oklahoma has been a "strict" Frye state. In other words, Oklahoma has not
modified or added to the basic Frye test. Allegations of error in the testing process
affect the weight of scientific evidence but not its admissibility.' In Oklahoma,
the Frye test has been used to exclude a lie detector test and a truth serum test,
24
to rule that the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (blood alcohol) test is inadmissible at
trial,' to uphold a trial court's exclusion of a polygraph test, to admit expert
testimony concerning child "Accommodation Syndrome,"2'7 to uphold a trial court's
decision to admit a fiber analysis test,' and to determine that DNA evidence is
admissible at trial."
While all of the above cases were decided by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not been oblivious to the Frye test. In
a dissenting opinion, Justice Opala of the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that it
was error to admit into evidence a human leukocyte antigen (HLA) test in a
paternity suit." The opinion emphasized the absence of expert testimony
17. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cit. 1974).
18. Paul B. Tyler, The Kelly-Frye "General Acceptance" Standard Remains the Rule for
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: People v. Leahy, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1274, 1278 (1995).
19. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1985).
20. Id.
21. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
22. See Henderson v. State, 230 P.2d 495, 502-03 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951).
23. Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 324 n.13 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
24. Henderson, 230 P.2d at 506.
25. Yell v. State, 856 P.2d 996, 997 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
26. Paxton v. State, 867 P.2d 1309, 1324 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
27. Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d 655, 658 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
28. Driskell v. State, 659 P.2d 343, 356 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
29. Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 329 n.37 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
30. Callison v. Callison, 687 P.2d 106, 115 (Okla. 1984) (Opala, J., dissenting).
1996]
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regarding the reliability of the testing technique." At this point, it is impossible
to predict whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court will follow the lead of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and apply Daubert, rather than Frye, in civil
cases. That decision will be made the next time the court hears a case involving
expert testimony or novel scientific evidence.
B. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
1. Facts of Daubert
In Daubert, two minor children and their parents alleged that the mothers'
ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription antinausea drug, caused the children's birth
defects." The district court granted Merrell Dow's motion for summary judg-
ment 3 based on published scientific literature which stated that maternal use of
Bendectin had not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects. 4
Plaintiffs' attorney offered evidence of animal studies, chemical structure analyses,
and unpublished "reanalysis" of human statistical studies to show that Bendectin
was capable of causing birth defects." Although all eight witnesses who offered
this evidence were well credentialed,' the court applied the Frye test and ruled
the evidence inadmissible. 7 The Ninth Circuit, reviewing the issue de novo,
affirmed.38 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "in light of sharp
divisions among the courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of
expert testimony.""
The United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence
(Rules), specifically Rule 702 which provides for expert testimony, superseded
Frye.4' Interpreting the Rules as it would any other legislatively enacted statute,
the Court initially examined the text of the Rules.42 Rule 42'3 provides a
standard for liberal admissibility." Further, Rule 4014' establishes a broad
31. ld. (Opala, J., dissenting).
32. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
33. Id. at 583.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 583-84.
36. Id. at 583.
37. Id. at 583-84.
38. Daubert v. Merrall Dow Pharm., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 509 U.S. 579
(1993).
39. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
40. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to deterine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R.
EVID. 702.
41. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-88.
42. Id. at 587.
43. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EViD. 402.
44. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
45. "Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
[Vol. 49:385
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definition of relevance.' Acknowledging that Frye predated the Rules by half a
century, the Court then cited United States v. Abet 7 for the theoretical proposition
that "the Rules occupy the field."" When a specific rule speaks to the contested
issue, it displaces existing common law.49 Because nothing in the text or drafting
history of Rule 702 establishes "general acceptance" as a prerequisite to
admissibility, the Court ruled that the Frye test is incompatible with the liberal
thrust of the Rules and should not be applied in federal trials."
2. The Daubert "Standard"
The Daubert Court established a new standard which requires the trial judge to
act as a "gatekeeper" to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.""1 The Court stated that judges will
primarily look to Rule 702 when deciding the reliability issue.' The term
"scientific knowledge" in the text of the Rule is of particular importance. In the
Court's words, "[t]he adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science.' Similarly, the word 'knowledge' connotes more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation."' To qualify as "scientific knowl-
edge," an inference or assertion must derive from the scientific method.5 Thus,
the path to admissibility begins with application of the specific scientific method
at issue.
The Court then discussed the Rule 702 requirement that evidence or testimony
"assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue." This condition, according to the majority, goes primarily to relevance.'
Moreover, relevancy under Rule 702 requires that the expert testimony proffered
be sufficiently tied to the facts of the case so that it will aid the jury in resolving
a factual dispute. 8 This "helpfulness" standard of Rule 702 requires "a valid
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility."59
Next, the Court cited Rule 104(a)' ° for the proposition that the trial judge, when
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
46. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
47. 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984).
48. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
49. Id. at 588.
50. Id at 588-89.
51. Id. at 589.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 590.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id at 591.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 591-92.
60. Rule 104 provides:
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility
1996]
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faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, must determine "whether the
expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier
of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue."'" This inquiry requires the trial
judge to determine whether the reasoning or methodology that underlies the
testimony is scientifically valid. Also, the inquiry requires the trial judge to
determine whether that reasoning or methodology can properly be applied to the
facts at issue.'
While declining to set out a definitive checklist or test, the Court expressed
confidence in federal judges' ability to undertake the Daubert review.' The Court
did, however, provide some "general observations" to assist the courts in evaluating
scientific methodology: (1) Can the scientific theory or technique at issue be
tested, and has it been tested? (2) Has the theory or technique been subjected o
peer review and publication? (3) What is the potential rate of error of the
technique at issue? and (4) What degree of acceptance does the theory or technique
have in the scientific community?.
Finally, the Court emphasized that the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is a
flexible one. "Its overarching subject is the scientific validity - and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability - of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions that they generate."6'
3. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Opinion
Concurring in pat, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, agreed
that Frye had been superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence.' However, he
also dissented in part because he would not have offered the vague "general
observations" derived by the majority through "abstract" construction of the
Rules' Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's observations regarding the factors
that ought to bear on admissibility. Specifically, Rehnquist cited Part 11-B of the
majority's opinion which states that reliability and relevancy are the touchstones
of admissibility.' While agreeing that Rule 401 defines "relevancy," Rehnquist
of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (1).
In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence excelpt those with
respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
FED. R. EvID. 104.
61. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
62. Id. at 592-93.
63. Id. at 593.
64. Id. at 593-94.
65. Id. at 594.
66. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Id. at 599 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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was unable to discover any direct authority for the "reliability" requirement
imposed by the majority." Rehnquist stated that the statutory parsing used by the
majority to create a reliability requirement will lead to countless questions when
district judges attempt to apply the Court's teaching to particular offers of expert
testimony." Rehnquist ended his dissent with the following admonition: "I do not
doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in
deciding questions of admissibility of proffered expert testimony. But I do not
think it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become amateur
scientists in order to perform that role."'
4. Other Criticisms of Daubert
The Honorable Martin L.C. Feldman, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, classifies the Daubert standard as disappointing and
suggests that the practical impact of Daubert could be both minimal and
confusing.' According to Judge Feldman, Daubert offers an awkward analytical
model at best.74 "The Court failed to provide trial judges with a well-defined
standard for separating unreliable scientific evidence from reliable scientific
evidence."' Noting that the fourth "general observation" listed by the Daubert
Court is the Frye "general acceptance" test, Judge Feldman accuses the Court of
sending conflicting signals to trial courts by abandoning Frye and then resurrecting
it as one consideration under the new standard.76 Not only are the results under
Daubert likely to be the same as those under Frye,' the criticisms are also likely
to be the same. Like Frye, Daubert may also fail to liberalize the admissibility of
scientific evidence.78
5. Oklahoma's Application of Daubert
Oklahoma has applied the Daubert standard only once. In Taylor v. State,79 the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals adopted Daubert and then applied the
Daubert standard to the DNA evidence at issue. The court ruled that DNA match
evidence obtained through restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP)
analysis and DNA statistics calculated through standard population genetics
formulas pass the Daubert test.' As a result of Taylor, Oklahoma's trial judges
faced with DNA profiling evidence produced through these means will not have
70. Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Id. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Martin L.C. Feldman, May I Have The Next Dance, Mrs. Frye?, 69 TUL. L. REv. 793, 802-03
(1995).
74. Id. at 806.
75. lId at 806-07.
76. Id. at 807.
77. ILd at 805.
78. Id. at 804.
79. 889 P.2d 319 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
80. Id. at 338.
1996]
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to conduct a Daubert pretrial admissibility hearing."' While trial judges in
Oklahoma will not have to reexamine this issue, a world of scientific evidence
awaits their attention in the future. Likewise, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court, provided it adopts the Daubert
standard in civil caes, could be kept very busy independently reviewing trial
judges' decisions to admit or exclude scientific evidence under Daubert.Y
IlL Taylor v. State
A. Facts of the Case
On May 23, 1988, an intruder broke a window and entered S.H.'s home. 3 After
demanding and obt.ining money from S.H., the intruder raped S.H. and forced
both S.H. and her mother, A.H., to orally sodomize him.' Taylor was apprehend-
ed after S.H. helped the police compose a sketch of the assailant." Taylor
voluntarily provided the police with saliva, blood, and hair samples.' These
specimens, along with oral washings from both S.H. and A.H. and blood and
semen samples collected from their clothing, were sent to a laboratory for
testing." Using DNA Print Identification, scientists determined that the DNA in
Taylor's blood sample "matched" the DNA in the semen found on the clothing of
S.H. and A.H.'
The trial court held an in camera hearing in which it determined that the DNA
testing met the admissibility standard set forth in Frye." Three expert witnesses
testified at trial. One of these experts was the scientist who had performed the
DNA test on the samples taken from Taylor and the victims. This expert explained
the procedure to tha jury and stated that the results showed a match between
Taylor's DNA and the DNA found on the victims' clothing.' Taylor was
convicted of first degree burglary, first degree rape, forcible oral sodomy, and first
degree robbery.9
Taylor appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, claiming, among
other things, inadmissibility of the DNA test results.' After determining that the
issue was one of first impression in Oklahoma, the court remanded Taylor's case
to the trial court and ordered an evidentiary hearing.' The purpose of the
81. Id.
82. See id. at 339 ("This court will independently review a trial judge's decision admitting or
excluding novel scientific or technical evidence to determine whether it passes muster under Daubert.").
83. Id. at 322.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 322-23.
88. Id. at 323.
89. Id.
90. Il
91. Id at 322.
92. Id. at 324.
93. Ia
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evidentiary hearing was to determine the following: "whether DNA fingerprinting
is generally accepted in the scientific community; whether the statistical
conclusions derived from DNA fingerprinting are generally accepted in the
scientific community; and, whether the procedures used in Taylor's case comported
with generally accepted scientific procedures."' The court affirmatively answered
each of these questions.95 Taylor then filed a supplemental proposition in which
he argued that the DNA match evidence and accompanying statistics used against
him were "obtained through procedures which have not gained general acceptance
in the scientific community and should therefore have been excluded under
Frye." Additionally, Taylor attacked the procedures the laboratory used in
performing the DNA test in his case.' The United States Supreme Court rendered
the Daubert decision after the evidentiary hearing in Taylor but prior to Taylor's
appeal from that hearing.
B. The Court of Criminal Appeals' Holding
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided that the DNA evidence
admitted against Taylor did pass the Frye test, which was the proper standard at
the time the evidentiary hearing was held." Then, after reevaluating the Frye
general acceptance method for determining the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence, the court decided to abandon that test and adopt the more flexible
standard fashioned by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert.' After
deciding that the DNA evidence presented against Taylor also passed muster under
Daubert, Taylor's conviction and sentence were affirmed.'"
C. The Majority's Stated Purpose For Abandoning Frye In Favor Of Daubert
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the adoption of Daubert
will "provide structure and guidance to what has until now been a potentially
confusing and sparsely defined area of legal analysis in our state jurispru-
dence.'... The court noted that in pertinent cases, it had not consistently relied
upon Frye when faced with questions involving the admissibility of expert
testimony describing novel scientific evidence." Instead of using Frye consis-
tently, section 2702 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code"° had been used to deter-
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Ra.
97. Id.
98. Il at 329 n.37.
99. Id. at 338.
100. Id. at 340.
101. Id. at 329.
102. Id. at 328-29.
103. Section 2702 provides: "If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2702 (1991).
19961
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mine the admissibility of expert testimony describing novel scientific evidence."
Furthermore, in cases utilizing the Frye test, the possible prejudicial effect of the
expert testimony at issue had generally been ignored." The majority justified its
decision to abandon Frye in favor of Daubert by stating that the adoption of
Daubert ensures that relevant sections of the Oklahoma Evidence Code are given
appropriate consideration in admission decisions." Noting that the Daubert
standard is both "stla-ctured" and "flexible,"'" the court stated that the Daubert
approach provides "a uniform method of addressing the admissibility of expert
testimony on all types of scientific evidence."" s
D. The Taylor Court's Interpretation of Daubert and How It Will Be Applied in
the Future
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated that because it had conducted
a detailed examination of DNA profiling techniques and had determined that those
techniques passed the Daubert standard, courts faced with DNA evidence produced
through those mears will not need to conduct Daubert pretrial admissibility
hearings. 9 However, pretrial Daubert hearings must be held if either party offers
scientific or technical evidence which has not previously been considered in
Oklahoma."' Future Daubert hearings will determine whether scientific evidence
is sufficiently "reliable" and "relevant" to warrant admission, and whether the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice."'
Reliability will be determined by using the four factors enumerated in Daubert:
(1) Whether the scientific method at issue has been or can be tested; (2) Whether
the theory has been s;ubjected to peer review; (3) Whether the scientific procedure
has a known or potential rate of error; and (4) Whether the scientific evidence at
issue has gained acceptance in the relevant scientific community."' However,
these four factors are neither exclusive nor necessarily dispositive, they merely aid
the reliability determination which is the responsibility of the trial judge."'
The relevancy component requires that the evidence bear a valid scientific
connection to the pertinent inquiry, thereby assisting the trier of fact in assessing
the issues."' Finally, on appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals will
104. Taylor, 889 P.2i at 329.
105. Il
106. Id.
107. Id. at 328.
108. Il at 329.
109. l at 338.
110. Id. at 339.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 339 n.88.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 339.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol49/iss2/7
NOTES
independently review a trial judge's decision to admit or exclude novel scientific
or technical evidence to determine whether it passes muster under Daubert."5
E. The Concurring Opinions
While the majority opinion of Taylor v. State illustrates good reasons to abandon
Frye and adopt Daubert, the concurring opinions reveal potential difficulties that
Oklahoma's trial judges will face. Judge Lane, specially concurring, stated that the
decision to shift the responsibility of determining the scientific reliability of new
scientific theories from the scientific community to trial judges may be "ill advised
from a practical standpoint.""' 6 While agreeing with the legal analysis used by
the majority, he expressed concern for the practical application of the results. His
recommendation is that the Oklahoma legislature and the Oklahoma Bar
Association consider the Taylor decision and "determine if new legislation is
needed.""'
Judge Lumpkin, concurring in the result, echoed these same concerns in greater
detail. Initially, he criticized the majority's adoption of Daubert because he
perceived that the issue was not properly before the court."' This criticism is
based on the fact that the applicability of Daubert was neither presented to the trial
court nor mentioned in the briefs filed with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals."' Judge Lumpkin also addressed the potential impact of the adoption of
Daubert.
Judge Lumpkin's first expressed concern is the disparity in resources between
federal district' courts and state trial courts."n) Unlike state trial court judges,
federal district judges have "virtually unlimited resources" such as "law clerks and
support personnel to assist them in their administrative and adjudicatory
duties."'' Next, he pointed out the fact that federal judges have the use of Rule
706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence'" which has not been incorporated into the
115. Id.
116. Id. at 341 (Lane, J., concurring specially).
117. Id. (Lane, J., concurring specially).
118. Id. at 341-42 (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
119. Id. (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
120. Id. at 342 (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
121. Id.
122. Rule 706 provides:
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter
an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request
the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witness agreed upon
by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness
shall not be appointed by the court unless the witness consents to act. A witness so
appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties by the court in writing, a copy of which
shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity
to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if
any; the witness' deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to
testify by the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by
each party, including a party calling the witness.
1996]
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Oklahoma Evidence Code.l" Rule 706 provides for the appointment of an
independent expert to assist the court in the evaluation of "novel" scientific
theories.U Further, even though armed with greater resources, federal courts are
presently required to shoulder only 2% of the litigation burden in the United
States." The fact that few judges are "endowed with the educational and
experiential background to be able to determine the technical validity of scientific
theory" amplifies these concerns.'"
Judge Lumpkin did not criticize without offering suggestions. Lumpkin opined
that if the legislature did not intend the results that have been reached via Daubert
and Taylor, they shculd act to sufficiently restrict the application of section 2702
of the Oklahoma Evidence Code.'" Such a restriction should be in the form of
laying a foundation prior to the admissibility of the opinion evidence." Howev-
er, if the results reached via Daubert and Taylor are the intent of the legislature,
then the legislature should ensure that Oklahoma's trial judges have the resources
needed to conduct Daubert investigations.'" Specifically, funding is needed to
provide judges with research tools, support personnel, and continuing education
which will assist fihem in determining the "reliability" of "novel" scientific
evidence.'30 Additionally, "the Oklahoma legislature should adopt the provisions
of Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence...'3' Judge Lumpkin suggested that
the statutory language should "not only permit the use of court-appointed experts
by trial courts, but also create the procedure for their appointment, the scope of
their role in serving as a court-appointed expert, and provide for appropriate
compensation and funding."'
32
Finally, Judge Lumpkin took issue with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals' de novo standard of review. He recommended that the trial court record
bind the appellate court in determining whether "the trial judge abused his or her
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable
compensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation thus fixed is
payable from fund!-, which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil actions and
proceedings involving just compensation under the fifth amendment. In other civil actions
and proceedings tte compensation shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at
such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of Appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may
authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness.
(d) Parties' Exparts of Own Selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling
expert witnesses of" their own selection.
FED. R. EVID. 706.
123. Taylor, 889 P.2I at 342 (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
124. Id. (Lumpkii, J, concurring in result).
125. Id. (Lumpkiu, J, concurring in result).
126. Id. (Lumpkin, J, concurring in result).
127. Id. at 343 (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
128. Id. (Lumpkin, J, concurring in result).
129. id. (Lumpkin, J, concurring in result).
130. Id. (Lumpkin, J, concurring in result).
131. Id. (Lumpkin, J, concurring in result).
132. Id. (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
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discretion in admitting or denying the evidence based on the evidence presented
to the trial court."'3 Oklahoma must place "full faith and credit" in the abilities
of trial judges and "not initiate a process that seeks to second-guess their decision
making process.""lM
IV. Analysis
The concurring opinions are both insightful and thought-provoking. Judge
Lumpkin's points are well taken, especially in light of Justice Blackmun's comment
in the United States Supreme Court case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals.'35 In Part 11-C of the Daubert opinion, Justice Blackmun stated,
"We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this
review."'" Because Justice Blackmun did not express a similar confidence in
state court judges, it seems clear that Daubert was only intended for federal courts
and was not intended to be adopted by state court systems. The hesitancy of other
state appellate courts to summarily adopt the Daubert methodology supports this
proposition.137 Overburdened state court dockets and financial constraints leave
state court judges in a less than optimal position to investigate and determine the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence.
With respect to Oklahoma's state courts, Judge Lane may have put it best when
he stated, "Heaven help us if a case comes along that relies on sub-atomic
physics."'' After Taylor, what happens if one of Oklahoma's trial court judges
is asked to determine the admissibility of evidence based on subatomic physics?
Initially, pursuant to sections 2105... and 2702 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code,
the trial judge would be required to determine whether the principles underlying
subatomic physics and the testing procedure utilizing subatomic physics are
reliable. Or, to put it another way, whether the principles and methodology at issue
are scientifically valid." To address this initial question of reliability, the trial
judge would need to examine the principles underlying subatomic physics and the
133. Id. at 344 (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
134. l (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
135. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
136. ld. at 593 (emphasis added).
137. See Taylor, 889 P.2d at 328 n.32 (noting that as of Jan. 31, 1995, seventeen reported state court
decisions had considered Daubert and in only two of those did the state court decide to abandon Frye
in favor of Daubert).
138. Id at 341 (Lane, J., concurring specially).
139. Section 2105 provides, in pertinent part:
A. Preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court,
subject to the provisions of subsection B of this section.
B. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact,
the judge shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
12 OKLA. STAT. § 2105 (1991).
140. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (scientific validity asks: "does the principle support what it
purports to show?").
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testing procedure at issue in light of the four "general observations" enunciated in
Daubert and applied in Oklahoma via Taylor.
(1) Can subatomic physics be tested and has it been tested? To answer this
question, the judge would have to know if the hypotheses surrounding subatomic
physics had been tested, falsified, and refined.' A judge could possibly do this
if subatomic physics is a subject which has received extensive literary attention.
Of course, this would require a willing judge to sacrifice many hours of valuable
time. Oklahoma's judges are intelligent, educated people, but education in the law
is much different than schooling in the hard sciences. Most judges would have
difficulty deciding if the principles underlying subatomic physics and the testing
procedures utilizing subatomic physics have been tested, falsified, and refined
simply by sitting down and reading a scientific journal. First, the judge would be
required to understand highly technical scientific terminology. Second, even if the
judge did come to the conclusion that subatomic physics has been testified,
falsified, and refined, the inquiry would not yet be over. The judge would have to
determine whether the testing, falsification, and refining lead to a conclusion that
the evidence at issue is reliable and therefore admissible.
(2) Has subatomic physics been subjected to peer review? Publication is one
element of peer review because submission to the scientific community for scrutiny
increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in the research will be detected.
However, publicatic n is not the only element of peer review and is not dispositive
of admissibility.42 Therefore, even if subatomic physics has been written on
extensively, the judge is not required to admit the evidence in question. From the
publications, the judge would have to determine if subatomic physics and testing
procedures utilizing the principles of subatomic physics are considered "valid" by
the scientific community. Scientific validity is one indication of reliability.
Reliability is the first step to admissibility.
(3) What is the known or potential rate of error in testing procedures utilizing
subatomic physics? The particular scientific technique's rate of error may also be
an important factor in determining the reliability of the technique.'43 This third
"general observation" will require the Oklahoma trial judge to critically analyze the
testing methodology at issue to determine if factors are present in the testing
process which can lead to an incorrect result and to determine the statistically
predictable occurrences of these errors. A technique which has a large rate of error
may be so unreliable that it must be ruled inadmissible.'"
For the purposes of this hypothetical, assume that the judge obtains a published
article written by a subatomic physicist. Assume further that the article states that
testing procedures utilizing the principles of subatomic physics have a 13% known
rate of error. What does this tell the judge? Is an 87% success rate "reliable"?
Is a 13% failure rate too inherently unreliable to even consider admitting the
141. See id. at 592-93.
142. lId at 593-94.
143. Id. at 594.
144. United States -. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1985).
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testing methodology into evidence? Does it matter if the case is civil or criminal?
Note that this inquiry begs another question: Will allegations of error in the testing
process continue to affect the weight of the scientific evidence but not its
admissibility? Or, will allegations of error in the testing process be another factor
an Oklahoma trial judge must weigh in determining reliability and therefore
admissibility?
4. Have the principles underlying subatomic physics and the testing procedure
at issue which relies on those principles gained acceptance in the relevant scientific
community? This question is the Frye "general acceptance" test and the problems
with it remain unchanged. "General acceptance" and "relevant scientific communi-
ty" are vague terms. The Oklahoma trial judge will have to initially decide which
scientific community encompasses subatomic physics. Then it is up to the judge
to decide if most members of that community believe that the principles underlying
subatomic physics are sound and also believe that the testing procedure at issue
which utilizes subatomic physics is reliable. Thus, the Oklahoma trial judge will
have to conduct a Frye hearing.
In determining reliability, the above four factors are not a definitive list of
considerations. Rather, they are simply representative of a flexible approach
endorsed by the Daubert Court.14 For purposes of the hypothetical, assume that
subatomic physics is a topic on which several articles have been published. Further
assume that the authors of the articles all agree that the principles underlying
subatomic physics and testing procedures utilizing subatomic physics are scientifi-
cally valid and reliable. The articles explain that testing procedures utilizing
principles of subatomic physics have been refined and have a very low rate of
error. Combined, these factors would give the trial judge a sense that the evidence
at issue is reliable.
The issue of reliability, however, may not yet be complete. If one or more of
the parties wishes to proffer the testimony of an expert on subatomic physics,
section 2703 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code"4 might be implicated. This rule
allows experts to base their testimony and opinions on evidence which may
otherwise be inadmissible. However, the facts and data on which the expert relies
must be of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field. Thus,
again, the trial judge must be educated in the subject of subatomic physics before
deciding whether an expert in the field can testify at trial. Additionally, section
145. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95.
146. Section 2703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
12 OKLA. STAT. § 2703 (1991).
1996]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
2705 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code may apply.'47 This gives the trial judge the
authority to require the expert to disclose, prior to stating his or her opinion, the
underlying data supporting the opinion. If the hypothetical trial judge did require
the hypothetical expert to disclose the underlying data supporting his or her
opinion of subatomiz physics, the judge would have to be able to interpret the data
for it to be helpful in making a determination of reliability and thus admissibility.
Once reliability is established, relevance is the next requirement that the trial
judge must consider in determining admissibility. Three sections of the Oklahoma
Evidence Code are particularly applicable. Relevant evidence, as defined by
section 2401,148 has a tendency to make a fact at issue more probable than it
would be without the evidence. Section 240214 states that all relevant evidence
is admissible; irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Finally, under section 2403, "
relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by, among other things, the danger of unfair prejudice or the potential
to confuse the issues or mislead the jury.
Assuming, for puiposes of the hypothetical, that the evidence at issue is relevant,
it is not difficult to see how evidence involving subatomic physics would be
confusing to a jury. Unlike the judge, jurors will not have the opportunity to
educate themselves on the subject of subatomic physics. Further, if an expert in
the field testifies, the jury is likely to be misled or prejudiced. The Daubert Court
recognized this fact when it stated, "[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and
quite misleading."'' Citing Judge Weinstein, the Court pointed out the fact that
judges should exercise more control over expert testimony than over lay witness-
es.' Therefore, even if the evidence concerning subatomic physics is both
reliable and relevant, the question of admissibility is a difficult one.
The Taylor majority was correct in stating that the adoption of Daubert will
ensure that relevant sections of the Oklahoma Evidence Code are given appropriate
consideration in admission decisions." However, it is difficult to see how the
Daubert approach provides a "uniform method of addressing the admissibility of
147. Section 2705 provides: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his
reasons therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination."
Id. § 2705.
148. Section 2401 provides: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would b-- without the evidence." Id. § 2401.
149. Section 2402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, by statute or by this
Code. Evidence which ir not relevant is not admissible." Id. § 2402.
150. Section 2403 provides: "Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful surprise." Id. § 2403.
151. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
152. Id
153. Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 329 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
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expert testimony on all types of scientific evidence."''" Rather than providing a
uniform method, the Taylor court has succeeded in laying a confusing foundation
that will lead to arbitrary results and frustrated trial judges.
The four enumerated "general observations" listed in the above hypothetical
assume that publicized information is available to the trial judge. If subatomic
physics is not an area that has enjoyed literary attention, what is a trial judge to
do? How can the judge obtain the information necessary to determine the
reliability of the evidence at issue? As Judge Lumpkin pointed out, federal judges
can employ Rule 706 and appoint an independent expert to assist him or her in the
evaluation of the scientific evidence at issue. 5 Unfortunately for Oklahoma's
state court judges, the Oklahoma legislature has not adopted a rule similar to Rule
706 into the Oklahoma Evidence Code.
The above hypothetical illustrates why each of Judge Lumpkin's suggestions
should be given serious consideration by the Oklahoma legislature. Subsequent to
incorporating Rule 706 into the Oklahoma Evidence Code, the legislature must
address the issue of funding. Oklahoma's trial judges have neither the time nor the
resources to invest in scientific investigation. More funding from the Oklahoma
legislature is critical. First, extra funding would allow the trial judges to employ
research assistants or law clerks, which allows the judge to focus his or her
attention on the trial docket while the assistant or clerk researches the scientific
evidence at issue. Second, extra funding would also allow trial judges to expand
their libraries to include science-related "bench books" and other educational
materials. 56 Finally, extra funding would allow Oklahoma's judges to participate
in continuing education opportunities. For example, The George Washington
University's Center for Health Policy Research sponsors a series of workshops held
under the auspices of state courts nationwide.' If the Oklahoma legislature
expects state court trial judges to assume the responsibilities once left to the
scientific community, it must equip them to be rational evaluators of scientific
evidence.
V. Conclusion
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was too hasty in abandoning Frye.
While the Frye test is outdated because it has been superseded by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, Oklahoma should have adequately prepared before adopting a
new standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Rule 706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence provides a way for federal district judges to appoint experts to
assist them in deciphering scientific evidence. The Oklahoma Evidence Code has
no comparable provision. Therefore, Oklahoma's trial judges have been forced into
somewhat of a twilight zone. They are now required to shoulder a very difficult
154. Id.
155. Id. at 342 (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
156. Paul S. Miller et al., Daubert and the Need for Judicial Scientifc Literacy, 77 JUDIcATURE 254,
259 (1994).
157. hM
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burden with very little guidance. The Daubert approach purports to be flexible, but
in reality it is vague, confusing, and ambiguous. Oklahoma's trial judges who, for
the most part, are unschooled in highly scientific or technical areas, do not have
the time or resources to educate themselves every time a new scientific theory
comes down the pike.
The Oklahoma legiSlature must act to remedy this lamentable situation. Most
importantly, Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence must be incorporated into
the Oklahoma Evidence Code. Providing a way for Oklahoma's trial judges to
appoint independent experts to assist them in evaluating scientific theories is an
absolute necessity. Additionally, Oklahoma's trial judges must be given adequate
funding to allow them to perform the difficult task mandated by Taylor.
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